Taiwan’s Political World: The Elusive 1992 Consensus
The Site of Elusive Consensus: Hong Kong in 1992 (sporvognsrejser.dk)
Article by Moritz Reinthaler
estimated reading time: seven minutes
It is November 1992, at a table in what was then British Hong Kong. Two organisations, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) representing the PRC and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) representing the ROC (Taiwan), are sitting across from each other, discussing various topics, but always reaching the same dead end. What, or rather who, is China? The talks end with the “1992 Consensus," in which both sides agree that there is only one China but disagree on what China means. This consensus is in fact a dissensus, reached so that both sides can put the problem of this important definition to the side, opening the door to more pressing issues like economic cooperation. Under this pretext, several cross-strait agreements have been reached, and the hot diplomatic waters have cooled as a result. The 1992 consensus is at the core of politics on the island and still shapes its political landscape.
Through the lens of this elusive consensus, this article will dive deep into the Taiwanese political world and examine the changing stance of the major Taiwanese political parties towards the ever-present China question.
But more on that later; to start off, one must take a look at the bigger picture. Before the Ming Dynasty, the Portuguese, Dutch, and Spanish colonised the island of Taiwan, which was already home to an indigenous population. In 1683, the Qing Dynasty gained control of large parts of the island, which lasted until 1895, when the island became a territory of Japan after the first Sino-Japanese war. After 1945 and the Japanese surrender, the island was returned to the Republic of China (ROC), led by Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT). Following corruption and mismanagement, discontent erupted in the form of a major uprising across cities on Taiwan on 28 February 1947, which was violently suppressed by the ROC government, marking the beginning of the White Terror era and martial law. In 1949, the Kuomintang retreated to the island after the KMT lost the civil war to the communist forces under Mao Zedong. In the years that followed, the Kuomintang, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, established a fascist regime, and the White Terror continued, targeting leftists, political dissidents, and pro-independence activists. After his father’s death, Chiang Ching-kuo became the leader and faced increasing opposition from democratic forces within the country, prompting him to start a dialogue. In 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was formed, and the process of democratisation was set into motion. Today, Taiwan is a robust democracy, with the two dominant parties being the KMT and the DPP. Relations with the mainland are often polarised in Taiwanese politics and remain tense.
The Kuomintang (KMT) and the 1992 Consensus
The KMT accepts the One China narrative, but the KMT’s interpretation allows for the preservation of Taiwan’s distinct political system and identity. It favours economic engagement, cultural exchange, and peaceful interaction with the PRC, believing that good relations are necessary for Taiwan’s security. Historically, the KMT took a one-China and anti-communist stance under Chiang Kai-shek.
This stance softened in wake of the 1992 Consensus, in which both the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT accepted that there is one China, with different interpretations of what China means. This consensus is often credited as the basis for diplomatic discourse and the precondition for the KMT’s cross-strait dialogue. As stated in the introduction, the 1992 Consensus is actually a dissensus and its origins are disputed. Su Chi, the then director of the MAC, actually admitted inventing it as a merely symbolic and political term; however, at the same time, the consensus is a genius political tool. It essentially establishes that there is only one true "China." What China means is intentionally left vague. This way both sides were able to save face and claim they came to an agreement that there truly is only one true China. The PRC quickly adopted it, as it was advantageous to them, because recognising the consensus in their eyes meant recognising that Taiwan was not an independent country but a part of China. The ROC’s current position is that the consensus means that there is only one China, but there is a disagreement on who that China is (PRC vs. ROC). Although both sides interpreted the consensus differently, they nonetheless agreed to it, which allowed them to sidestep the issue of the political status of Taiwan. This consensus opened the door to further negotiations on economic cooperation, which eventually built mutual trust between the then-ruling KMT and the CCP.
From 2008 to 2016, the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou was president, during which time the KMT promoted policies that increased economic interdependence and sought to reduce tensions. Following the loss of Hong Kong’s autonomy, which shocked many Taiwanese citizens and put the KMT’s cooperative stance towards China into a bad light, the KMT faced an uphill battle in the 2020 elections. However, in the 2024 elections, the party seems to be gaining traction again. With a growing third party, the KMT may have to cooperate in the future, as currently neither KMT nor DPP have a majority in Taiwan’s parliament (Legislative Yuan) without the Taiwanese People’s Party (TPP). This could force the KMT to make concessions in its sympathetic stance towards China.
The Birth of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
The founding of the DPP dates back to 1986. It was founded on the hopes of establishing a multiparty system, self-determination for ethnically Taiwanese, democracy, and economic ties with the mainland. Although the founding year was 1986, the roots of the DPP were laid down in 1883, when most political parties were still banned under martial law. As a result, many of the DPP’s leading figures were imprisoned during these early years. A significant milestone for the party was the 1986 election, in which they won 10 percent of the seats in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s parliament. In the 1989 election, opposition parties were allowed to participate as organised parties for the first time, leading to the DPP winning 20% of seats. Amid debates on Taiwanese national identity, the party positioned itself with the goal of establishing a “Taiwanese republic with independent sovereignty." During the 1990s, the party struggled to attract voters; however, after the 1998 election, the DPP surged to 32% of the seats in the Legislative Yuan, buoyed by widespread discontent, and eventually won the following presidential race in 2000.
Compared to the KMT, the DPP is more critical of the PRC, particularly of its authoritarian rule and assertive policies towards Taiwan. It emphasises the importance of democracy and human rights and sees itself as a counterweight to the Chinese Communist Party, standing in solidarity with pro-democracy movements in mainland China. Nonetheless, the DPP believes that dialogue with the PRC is important but demands it be based on mutual respect for the sovereignty and the democratic will of the Taiwanese people. This was evident during the 2000-2008 presidency of Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan’s first non-KMT president. He promoted Taiwanese national identity and the use of the term Taiwan in international contexts and was strongly opposed to Beijing’s “one China, two systems” policy. In a 2002 statement titled “one country on each side,” he took an aggressive step towards independence, resulting in increased efforts by China to isolate Taiwan and deter it from making a formal declaration of independence. In the 2004 election, he ran on a policy of countering China’s missile threat and sought to reform the constitution to allow further steps towards independence, which he abandoned after considerable pressure from China and the US, as well as domestic political constraints. The US became increasingly frustrated with Chen’s unpredictability and the resulting increased risk of military conflict with China.
After leaving office, Chen Shui-Bian was convicted on several corruption charges, including bribery, money laundering, and embezzlement. In 2009, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, although his sentence was later reduced to 20 years. Since then, consecutive corruption scandals have tarnished the DPP’s reputation considerably.
Is the TPP a much-needed breath of fresh air? The TPP initially presented itself as a pragmatic alternative to the ideologically driven KMT and DPP. This new approach was warmly welcomed and rewarded with 26% of the vote in the last presidential election for its candidate and chairman, Ko Wan-je. In addition, the TPP controls eight seats in the Legislative Yuan, giving it the power to make or break any legislation by the current President Lai Ching-te (DPP). So far, the TPP has sided with the KMT in challenging Lai’s agenda, such as his plans to build additional submarines. The TPP is currently experiencing internal turmoil, as Ko has been detained on corruption charges, specifically allegations that he took bribes from real estate developers during his tenure as mayor of Taipei. As of the 5th of September, he remains in detention on suspicion of violating the Anti-Corruption Act, which carries a minimum sentence of five years in prison. The TPP continues to support him, accusing the judiciary of serving the interests of the DPP. Whether the TPP can survive the test of time and rebuild its waning influence remains to be seen.
Conclusion
It is difficult to summarise the relationship and policies of the three parties in short. The KMT is more open to economic engagement with the mainland, while the DPP is adamantly opposed to any “one China” policy. In the middle is the TPP, which had declared itself to be pragmatic and non-ideological but which nevertheless stands behind its chairman dogmatically. The KMT is focused on maintaining peace and good diplomatic relations, viewing the relationship as more pragmatic, ironically being in contrast to their historic past, less ideologically opposed to unification. The DPP, on the other hand, had economic cooperation with the mainland as one of its founding principles, but now is wary of too much cooperation.
Overall, the Taiwanese political stage is relatively unique in that on one side there is a conservative party seeking a normalisation of diplomatic relations and seeing economic benefit in working together, while on the other side is a liberal party that supports increased military spending and nationalism and is diplomatically inflammatory with its pro-independence rhetoric, straining diplomatic tensions with both China and the USA.
